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Can Associations 
Have Priority over 
Fannie or Freddie?
By R. Wilson Freyermuth and Dale A. Whitman
R. Wilson Freyermuth is the John D. Lawson
Professor and Curators’ Teaching Professor
at the University of Missouri–Columbia
School of Law and the group chair of the
Legal Education and Uniform Laws Group
of the Section. Dale A. Whitman is professor
and dean emeritus at the University of
Missouri–Columbia.
I
n the typical common interest devel-
opment, an owners’ association has 
a lien on each unit or lot within the 
development to secure the payment of 
delinquent assessments. In states that 
have enacted section 3-116 of the Uni-
form Condominium Act (UCA) or its 
successor, the Uniform Common Inter-
est Ownership Act (UCIOA), this lien is 
entitled to priority over an otherwise-
irst mortgage lien, for six months of 
unpaid assessments based on the asso-
ciation’s annual budget. (States vary in 
their adoption of the uniform statutes 
and a few have changed the six-month 
period; for example, the applicable 
period in Nevada is nine months.) Stat-
utes in approximately 20 states give this 
limited priority to an association’s lien.
Several recent state court cases inter-
preting these statutes have held that 
the association’s lien has not only a 
payment priority (that is, not merely a 
right to irst payment following a fore-
closure by the irst mortgage lender) 
but a “true lien priority” over an oth-
erwise-irst lien mortgage—such that 
the foreclosure of the association’s lien 
places the otherwise-irst mortgage 
lien at risk of being extinguished. If the 
association forecloses its lien, and the 
otherwise-irst mortgage lender does 
not step forward and redeem its inter-
est by paying off the priority portion of 
the association’s lien before the sale, the 
association’s sale of the unit or lot will 
extinguish the irst mortgage lien. See, 
e.g., SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. 
Bank, N.A., 334 P.3d 408 (Nev. 2014); 
Chase Plaza Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. J.P. Mor-
gan Chase Bank, N.A., 98 A.3d 166 (D.C. 
Ct. App. 2014); Summerhill Village Home-
owners Ass’n v. Roughley, 270 P.3d 639 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
An association’s six-month lien pri-
ority is sometimes termed a “superlien,” 
but there is nothing particularly “super” 
about it; the statute simply provides 
that an association has a lien with pri-
ority over the irst mortgage, much 
like the lien of property taxes in nearly 
all states. An association’s total lien is 
effectively split into two components: 
a lien before the irst mortgage for six 
months of assessments and a lien junior 
to the irst mortgage for any delinquent 
assessment amount over six months’ 
worth. In this way, section 3-116 was 
intended to strike “an equitable balance 
between the need to enforce collection 
of unpaid assessments and the obvi-
ous necessity for protecting the priority 
of the security interests of lenders.” 
UCIOA § 3-116, cmt. 1; Joint Editorial 
Board for Uniform Real Property Acts, 
The Six-Month “Limited Priority Lien” 
for Association Fees Under the Uniform 
Common Interest Ownership Act (June 1, 




This careful balance is in jeopardy, 
however, as the result of challenges 
from the Federal Housing Finance 
Authority (FHFA), claiming that asso-
ciations cannot foreclose on assessment 
liens without the FHFA’s consent if the 
property is subject to mortgages held 
by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. After 
explaining the basis for the FHFA’s 
novel defense, this article gives several 
reasons why courts should reject the 
defense.
12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3): 
FHFA’s Belated Response to 
Association Lien Foreclosures
In SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. 
Bank, N.A., 334 P.3d 408 (Nev. 2014), 
the Nevada Supreme Court ruled 
that an association’s foreclosure of its 
limited priority assessment lien extin-
guished the otherwise-irst mortgage 
lien when the mortgagee failed to 
redeem its position by satisfying the 
priority portion of the association’s 
lien before the association’s fore-
closure sale. Following this result, 
Fannie Mae and its conservator, the 
FHFA, have now sued in the U.S. Dis-
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seeking to set aside the association 
lien foreclosure sale. Federal Nati’l 
Mortg. Ass’n v. SFR Investments Pool 
1, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-02046-JAD-PAL 
(hereafter Fannie Mae v. SFR Invest-
ments). In this action, Fannie Mae and 
FHFA have raised a novel defense 
based on certain statutory language 
enacted as part of the Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act of 2008 
(HERA). HERA created the FHFA and 
transferred to it the supervisory pow-
ers over the government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac previously held by the 
Ofice of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO) and the Fed-
eral Housing Finance Board (Finance 
Board). On September 6, 2008, shortly 
after the enactment of HERA, FHFA 
placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
into federal conservatorship under 
the new authority given by HERA.
HERA contains a provision stating 
that when FHFA acts as conserva-
tor, “[n]o property of the Agency shall 
be subject to levy, attachment, garnish-
ment, foreclosure, or sale without the 
consent of the Agency, nor shall any 
involuntary lien attach to the prop-
erty of the Agency.” 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)
(3). Based on this language, Fannie Mae 
and FHFA argued in Fannie Mae v. SFR 
Investments that because the association 
foreclosed its assessment lien without 
the prior consent of FHFA, the asso-
ciation’s foreclosure sale was invalid 
under federal law.
By its terms, nothing in 12 U.S.C.  
§ 4617(j)(3) negates the association’s 
lien or reduces the extent to which it 
is entitled to priority under state law. 
Instead, according to Fannie and FHFA, 
the statute purportedly prevents the 
association from foreclosing its lien 
without FHFA’s consent while the 
GSEs are in conservatorship. Presum-
ably, if Fannie or Freddie foreclosed its 
irst mortgage, acquired title to the unit, 
and subsequently sold it, the superpri-
ority portion of the association’s lien 
would survive all of these transactions 
and remain enforceable against the 
unit’s purchaser. If this is correct, then 
obviously any purchaser aware of the 
association’s priority lien would reduce 
the amount they would be willing to 
pay for the property by the amount 
of the priority lien, and eventually the 
association would recover that amount. 
But if the association is in signiicant 
inancial dificulty—as is often the case 
with associations facing signiicant 
numbers of assessment delinquencies—
it may be unable, as a practical matter, 
to wait out these events.
As yet, no reported cases construe 
12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3). Its language was 
borrowed directly from the statute gov-
erning the rights of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in its 
capacity as receiver of insolvent banks, 
enacted in 1989 as part of FIRREA (the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, 
and Enforcement Act of 1989):
No property of the Corporation 
shall be subject to levy, attach-
ment, garnishment, foreclosure 
or sale without the consent of the 
corporation, nor shall any invol-
untary lien attach to the property 
of the corporation.
12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2). Courts have 
routinely upheld this FDIC statute. In 
Matagorda County v. Russell Law, 19 F.3d 
215 (5th Cir. 1994), the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded 
mortgages acquired by the FDIC as 
receiver were its “property” and were 
thus subject to the bar on foreclosure of 
any prior lien without the FDIC’s con-
sent. The prior lien at issue in Matagorda 
County v. Russell Law (and in virtually 
all other reported cases) was a local 
government’s property tax lien.
Because the language in 12 U.S.C.  
§§ 1825(b)(2) and 4617(j)(3) is essentially 
identical, Fannie Mae and the FHFA 
have claimed in Fannie Mae v. SFR 
Investments that an association likewise 
cannot foreclose its priority assessment 
lien on units covered by mortgages held 
by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac without 
the consent of the FHFA. In the authors’ 
view, however, numerous important 
contextual differences merit judicial 
rejection of the FHFA’s effort to use 12 
U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) as a legal ground to 
invalidate association lien foreclosure 
sales in Nevada and other states that 
have adopted the UCIOA limited prior-
ity association lien.
First, the FDIC statute applies to 
bank receiverships, and there is a sub-
stantial difference between the FDIC’s 
receivership of a failed bank and 
FHFA’s conservatorship of the GSEs. 
An FDIC receivership is relatively short-
lived; the FDIC will either sell the assets 
of the failed bank or get another bank 
to take them over, and this will ordinar-
ily occur within a matter of weeks or 
months. In this context, one can argue 
that 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) appropri-
ately prohibits foreclosures of FDIC 
property without the FDIC’s consent 
during the pendency of the receivership. 
Effectively, the statute functions as a 
temporary stay, enabling the FDIC to do 
its job as receiver quickly and without 
the distraction of having to respond to 
creditor enforcement of competing liens. 
By contrast, the FHFA’s conservatorship 
of the GSEs is now nearing seven years 
and shows no signs of being brought 
to a close soon. If 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) 
is given the same broad effect, an asso-
ciation could be stayed for years from 
foreclosing its assessment lien on a 
unit encumbered by a Fannie or Fred-
die mortgage, unless FHFA granted its 
consent to the association’s foreclosure. 
The burden on an association unable to 
foreclose its assessment lien would be 
commensurately much greater in this 
context than in an FDIC receivership.
The effect of HERA’s statutory 
language is likely to be much more 
onerous on a homeowners’ associa-
tion in a common interest community 
than the effect of the similar language 
governing FDIC’s receiverships on 
Fannie Mae and FHFA 
argued in Fannie Mae 
v. SFR Investments 
that because the 
association foreclosed its 
assessment lien without 
the prior consent of 
FHFA, the association’s 
foreclosure sale was 
invalid under 
federal law.
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local governments. A local govern-
ment’s property taxes apply to a wide 
variety of nonresidential real estate 
and to housing, and hence the delay in 
the local government’s ability to fore-
close its tax lien on a few residential 
properties on which FDIC holds mort-
gages will probably have only a minor 
economic effect on the local govern-
ment’s collection of tax revenues. Even 
if HERA’s language prevents tax lien 
foreclosure of all properties on which 
the GSEs have mortgages, the local 
government will still have many other 
properties available for foreclosure. By 
contrast, the delay in an owners’ associ-
ation’s ability to foreclose on properties 
with mortgages held by the GSEs will 
often mean the great majority of all of 
its liens are temporarily (though who 
knows for how long) unenforceable. For 
an association with many delinquent 
owners—hardly an unusual situation 
today—the economic results could be 
catastrophic.
Second, the longer delay associ-
ated with the FHFA’s conservatorship 
is compounded by HERA’s provid-
ing no procedure or standards by 
which the holder of a prior lien can 
obtain authority to foreclose its lien 
over FHFA’s objection. In the con-
text of bankruptcy, the harshness of 
the automatic stay against creditor 
enforcement actions is tempered by 
(1) the Bankruptcy Code’s standards 
for a secured creditor to obtain relief 
from the stay and (2) the creditor’s 
ability to obtain appellate review of 
a decision by the bankruptcy court 
denying relief from the stay. Not only 
does HERA purport to require FHFA’s 
consent before a foreclosure can extin-
guish its interest, but also HERA 
provides no standards by which 
FHFA’s decision to withhold its con-
sent can be evaluated.
FHFA has claimed that actions taken 
in its role as conservator of the GSEs 
are not subject to any judicial review. 
FHFA’s position is relected in recent 
litigation over the legality of FHFA’s 
actions on Property Assessed Clean 
Energy (or PACE) loans. When autho-
rized, PACE loans would permit a 
secured lender inancing certain energy-
eficiency-related renovations to obtain 
priority over a prior-recorded mortgage 
lien. Based on its concern that an expan-
sion in PACE lending could cause the 
subordination of mortgage liens held by 
the GSEs (and a threat to the solvency 
of the GSEs), FHFA issued a direc-
tive to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
protect themselves against these risks. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did so by 
announcing they would no longer pur-
chase mortgages on property subject to 
PACE loans. In response, the town of 
Babylon, New York, iled an action in 
federal court challenging the authority 
and constitutionality of FHFA’s direc-
tive regarding PACE loans. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
rejected this challenge, noting that
as a conservator, FHFA was 
expressly empowered to take 
“such action as may be—(i) nec-
essary to put [Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac] in a sound and 
solvent condition; and (ii) appro-
priate to . . . preserve . . . [their] 
assets and property.” 12 U.S.C.  
§ 4617(b)(2)(D). Directing protec-
tive measures against perceived 
risks is squarely within FHFA’s 
powers as a conservator.
Town of Babylon v. Federal Housing 
Finance Agency, 699 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 
2012). Likewise, other circuits have held 
actions taken by the FHFA within the 
scope of its powers as conservator are 
not subject to judicial review. See, e.g., 
County of Sonoma v. FHFA, 710 F.3d 987, 
992 (9th Cir. 2013).
In Fannie Mae v. SFR Investments, 
FHFA is taking the position that an 
owners’ association, despite its state law 
priority under UCIOA, cannot foreclose 
its assessment lien on a unit or lot cov-
ered by a Fannie or Freddie mortgage 
without FHFA’s consent—and FHFA 
can withhold its consent to such a fore-
closure in its sole and unreviewable 
discretion, for the indeinite duration 
of the FHFA’s conservatorship. For the 
reasons explained below, the authors 
believe the courts should reject this 
argument.
12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) as a 
Deprivation of Due Process
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the 
federal government from depriving a 
person of property without due process 
of law. A deprivation occurs when a 
governmental actor signiicantly alters 
or eliminates property rights recog-
nized by state law.
Although federal courts have not yet 
addressed a due process challenge to 12 
U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3), they have addressed 
a comparable due process challenge to 
FDIC’s invocation of 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)
(2) as a bar to actions by municipali-
ties to foreclose real property tax liens 
during FDIC receiverships. A represen-
tative case is Matagorda County v. Russell 
Law, 19 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 1994). In Rus-
sell Law, Matagorda County and several 
other municipal taxing authorities (the 
“Taxing Units”) sought to enforce their 
liens for unpaid real estate taxes on a 
parcel owned by Russell Law and cov-
ered by a deed of trust held by Bay City 
Bank & Trust Co. After Bay City failed 
and was placed into FDIC receiver-
ship, the Taxing Units joined the FDIC 
as a party to the tax lien foreclosure pro-
ceeding. The U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas held the Tax-
ing Units could not foreclose their liens 
absent the FDIC’s consent, which the 
FDIC would not give unless the fore-
closure was subject to the FDIC’s lien. 
The Taxing Units argued that by pro-
hibiting them from foreclosing without 
awarding them any recovery against 
the FDIC for the value secured by the 
tax liens, the FDIC had effectively taken 
the property of the Taxing Units with-
out just compensation.
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The court in Russell Law ultimately 
rejected this argument, but its state-
ments in doing so bear close review:
The indeterminate postponement 
of the Taxing Units’ ability to col-
lect on their tax lien, while not a 
“physical invasion” or a “perma-
nent appropriation” of their assets, 
is certainly a severe impairment 
of those assets. The Taxing Units 
make a persuasive argument 
that their ongoing viability—the 
ability to provide necessary com-
munity services, schools, ire and 
police protection, etc.—[is] greatly 
compromised by their inability to 
collect delinquent taxes. This argu-
ment does not fall on deaf ears.
. . . [T]his Court is not convinced 
that the [Taxing Units] have 
been deprived of a suficient 
property interest to create a com-
pensable taking. Congress was 
presented with the phenomenal 
task of addressing an impend-
ing catastrophe in the failure 
of inancial institutions and in 
response enacted FIRREA. Cer-
tain provisions therein are the 
classic example of a “public pro-
gram that adjusts the beneits and 
burdens of economic life to pro-
mote the common good.” Penn 
Cent., supra, 438 U.S. at 124. As 
the Court has stated, “Legislation 
designed to promote the general 
welfare commonly burdens some 
more than others.” Id. at 133. This 
Court has found that delay in the 
exercise of a valuable property 
right alone is not suficient to cre-
ate a compensable taking. That 
inding is tempered, indeed lim-
ited, by the acknowledgment that 
delay to this point is not suficient 
to constitute a compensable tak-
ing. Unmitigated delay, coupled 
with diminishment of distinct 
investment-backed expectations, 
may, at some point, infringe on the 
entire “bundle” of rights enjoyed 
by the [Taxing Units] to the point 
that a compensable taking occurs.
Matagorda County v. Russell Law, 19 F.3d 
at 224–25 (emphasis in original).
The Fifth Circuit’s admonition 
against unmitigated delay in Matagorda 
County is squarely appropriate to the 
FHFA’s position on 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)
(3). The FHFA’s conservatorship of the 
GSEs is now approaching seven years 
in duration, with no end in sight—
which unquestionably constitutes 
“unmitigated delay.” Further, in the 
wake of the housing crisis prompted 
by the Great Recession, many owners’ 
associations would not recover any-
thing in an association lien foreclosure 
if a lien foreclosure remained subject to 
the lien of the GSE mortgage (the bal-
ance of which often exceeds the value of 
the home). As a result, the association’s 
loss of the ability to foreclose its prior-
ity position threatens the association’s 
inances and its ability to preserve and 
maintain common elements, diminish-
ing the investment-backed expectations 
of the association’s owner members. If 
the FHFA can refuse to consent to the 
foreclosure of an association’s limited 
priority lien, with no possibility of judi-
cial review, for an indeinite period, 
then the FHFA’s invocation of 12 U.S.C. 
§ 4617(j)(3) deprives the association of 
its limited priority lien without due pro-
cess of law.
FHFA’s Behavior as “Consent” 
to Association Foreclosures
FHFA now argues that 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)
(3) prohibits an association from foreclos-
ing its limited priority lien to extinguish 
a conlicting GSE mortgage lien without 
FHFA’s prior consent. But FHFA’s consis-
tent conduct as conservator for the GSEs 
has manifested FHFA’s effective consent 
to state law lien priority and enforcement 
rules validating association lien foreclo-
sure sales like the ones being attacked in 
Fannie Mae v. SFR Investments.
FHFA functions as conservator for 
the GSEs in their roles (among others) 
as purchasers and securitizers of sin-
gle-family residential mortgage loans, 
the terms of which are explicitly gov-
erned by state law. In authorizing the 
GSEs to purchase and securitize such 
loans, FHFA should be understood to 
have impliedly consented to the state 
law priority and lien enforcement rules 
applicable to those mortgages under 
state law.
FHFA’s implied consent to an associ-
ation’s limited priority lien under UCA 
and UCIOA, and to an association’s 
foreclosure of such a lien, is manifested 
in the servicing guidelines published 
by the GSEs. The 2015 Fannie Mae Ser-
vicing Guide directs Fannie’s servicers 
to “take all reasonable actions to pre-
vent new liens that would be superior 
to Fannie Mae’s mortgage lien from 
being attached against property.” Servic-
ing Guide: Fannie Mae Single Family (Jan. 
14, 2015), at 391. This language explic-
itly acknowledges the risk that a Fannie 
mortgage can occupy a subordinate 
position under state law and directs 
Fannie’s servicers to take steps (includ-
ing the payment of delinquent taxes or 
association liens) as necessary to pre-
vent the attachment of a lien that would 
take priority over Fannie under state 
law. Similar language appeared in Fan-
nie’s servicing guidelines during prior 
years. See, e.g., Fannie Mae Single Fam-
ily 2011 Servicing Guide (June 10, 2011), 
at 302-2 (“When the HOA of a PUD or 
condo project notiies the servicer that 
a borrower is 60 days’ delinquent in 
the payment of assessments or charges 
levied by the association, the servicer 
should advance the funds to pay the 
charges if necessary to protect the pri-
ority of Fannie Mae’s mortgage lien. 
If the project is located in a state that 
has adopted the Uniform Condomin-
ium Act (UCA), the Uniform Common 
Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA), or a 
similar statute that provides for up to 
six months of delinquent regular con-
dominium assessments to have lien 
priority over the mortgage lien, Fannie 
In the wake of the 
housing crisis prompted 
by the Great Recession, 
many owners’ 
associations would 
not recover anything 
in an association lien 
foreclosure if its lien 
foreclosure remained 
subject to the lien of the 
GSE mortgage.
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Mae will reimburse the servicer for up 
to six months of such advances.”); Fan-
nie Mae Single Family 2012 Servicing 
Guide (Mar. 14, 2012), at 302-2 (same).
Under FHFA’s proffered interpre-
tation of 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3), such 
directives would be unnecessary. If 
property of the FHFA (including a 
Fannie mortgage lien) is not sub-
ject to lien attachment or foreclosure 
without FHFA’s consent, Fannie’s ser-
vicers would not need to act to protect 
Fannie’s priority. The directives that 
mandate Fannie’s servicers to act as 
needed to protect Fannie’s lien prior-
ity manifest FHFA’s “consent” to the 
operation of state law priority rules that 
accord a limited priority to association 
liens under UCA or UCIOA.
Furthermore, the current Fannie 
servicing guidelines make clear that 
servicers must inform Fannie of “non-
routine” litigation, including any action 
that “challenges the validity, priority, or 
enforceability of a Fannie Mae mort-
gage loan or seeks to impair Fannie 
Mae’s interest in an acquired property,” 
including “an attempt by another lien-
holder to assert priority over Fannie 
Mae’s lien or extinguish Fannie Mae’s 
interests.” Servicing Guide: Fannie Mae 
Single Family (Jan. 14, 2015), at 561, 563. 
This duty includes the opportunity to 
“[p]eriodically update Fannie Mae on 
the progress of non-routine litigation 
as necessary and appropriate” and to 
“[p]rovide Fannie Mae with suficient 
opportunity in advance of any dead-
line or due date to review and comment 
upon proposed substantive pleadings.” 
Id. at 562. If an association lien foreclo-
sure conducted without FHFA’s express 
consent is illegal and void, as FHFA 
now claims, these directives would 
serve no purpose. These directives like-
wise manifest FHFA’s implied consent 
to state law proceedings in which a 
holder of a conlicting lien entitled to 
priority under state law seeks to fore-
close its lien and extinguish Fannie’s 
mortgage lien.
Finally, at no point during the irst 
six years of FHFA’s conservatorship 
did the FHFA assert (or instruct the 
GSEs to assert) 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) as 
a basis to prevent association lien fore-
closure sales or to challenge the validity 
of such sales. By contrast, participation 
by the FHFA and the GSEs in litigation 
over the validity and priority of mort-
gage liens vis-à-vis association liens has 
demonstrated the FHFA’s general con-
sent to the operation of state law lien 
priority and enforcement rules as they 
relate to GSE mortgages. For exam-
ple, in Trademark Properties of Michigan, 
L.L.C. v. Federal Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 
313296, 2014 WL 6461712 (Mich. Ct. 
App. Nov. 18, 2014), Fannie Mae pur-
chased a condominium unit in Manor 
Homes of Troy at a judicial foreclo-
sure sale of a MERS mortgage in May 
2010. After Fannie acquired the unit, 
association dues went unpaid for the 
ensuing six months, and, in Decem-
ber 2010, the condominium association 
iled a notice of lien and subsequently 
foreclosed that lien by advertisement. 
At the sale in February 2011, Trade-
mark Properties of Michigan, L.L.C. 
(Trademark) purchased the unit for 
$6,761.45. Fannie Mae did not act to 
redeem the unit during the redemption 
period, but just before the redemption 
period expired, GMAC (the original 
lender) recorded an afidavit in the 
land records purporting to expunge 
the May 2010 foreclosure deed to Fan-
nie Mae. This afidavit asserted the May 
2010 foreclosure sale was void based 
on Residential Funding Co., LLC v. Sau-
rman, 807 N.W.2d 412 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2011), which had held MERS lacked 
authority to foreclose in its own name. 
Trademark then sued Fannie Mae 
and MERS seeking to quiet title, argu-
ing that the MERS foreclosure sale 
was valid and the subsequent associa-
tion lien foreclosure (and subsequent 
non-exercise of statutory redemption) 
extinguished Fannie Mae’s ownership 
of the unit. Shortly thereafter, the Michi-
gan Supreme Court reversed Saurman 
and held MERS did have authority 
to foreclose MERS mortgages. Both 
Trademark and Fannie Mae moved for 
summary judgment, and the trial court 
granted summary judgment to Fan-
nie Mae, concluding the May 2010 sale 
was invalid based on the law at the 
time of the sale. The Michigan Court 
of Appeals reversed, holding the May 
2010 sale was valid and rejecting Fan-
nie Mae’s alternative arguments that it 
had not received notice of the associa-
tion’s lien foreclosure. At no point did 
Fannie Mae raise the argument that 
the association’s foreclosure sale was 
invalid because the association did not 
obtain FHFA’s consent. The active par-
ticipation in this case by Fannie and its 
servicers conirms the view that the 
FHFA, in its role as conservator, has 
consented to the operation of state law 
lien priority and enforcement rules 
as they apply to Fannie and Freddie 
mortgages.
12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) Does 
Not Apply to Private Parties
As discussed above, 12 U.S.C. 4617(j)
(3) is fashioned after the comparable 
32   n JULY/AUGUST 2015
Published in Probate & Property, Volume 29, No 4 © 2015 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All 
rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored 
in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
FDIC consent provision enacted in 12 
U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) as part of FIRREA. 
If judicial interpretation of § 1825(b)
(2) provides a meaningful template 
for understanding the intended scope 
of § 4617(j)(3), § 4617(j)(3) does not 
invalidate association lien foreclosures 
under UCA and UCIOA. In fact, pre-
vious court decisions interpreting the 
FDIC consent provision in § 1825(b)(2) 
have concluded it precludes only tax 
lien foreclosure sales by state and local 
taxing authorities, not foreclosure 
sales by private parties.
The prevailing interpretation of 12 
U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) as directed only to 
state and local taxing authorities is 
demonstrated by the decision of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
in FDIC v. McFarland, 243 F.3d 876 (5th 
Cir. 2001). Rory McFarland obtained 
a $2.5 million loan from the Bank of 
Commerce, secured by a mineral lease 
mortgage and assignment. When the 
Bank of Commerce failed, the FDIC 
was appointed receiver for its assets, 
including the McFarland note. There-
after, two judgment creditors obtained 
judgments against McFarland. When 
the FDIC sued to collect the debt owed 
by McFarland, the judgment creditors 
intervened, seeking to have the pro-
ceeds of the mineral leases paid into 
court. The district court ordered McFar-
land to pay the FDIC from the proceeds 
in the court registry and recognized the 
mortgage as the irst priority lien. The 
FDIC reinscribed the 1984 mortgage 
and assignment in various Louisi-
ana parishes in July 1995, and in 1997 
the FDIC assigned the mortgage and 
assignment to the Dennis Joslin Com-
pany. In 1998 Joslin sought to foreclose 
the property subject to the 1984 mort-
gage and to obtain distribution of the 
proceeds that had accumulated in the 
court registry. David L. Jump, one of the 
judgment creditors, objected, contend-
ing the FDIC’s failure to reinscribe the 
1984 mortgage and assignment within 
10 years of its execution resulted in a 
loss of priority, such that Jump’s judg-
ment lien now had priority. The district 
court agreed, holding FDIC’s reinscrip-
tion in 1995 was untimely and thus 
deprived Joslin of irst priority.
Joslin argued that 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)
(2), as enacted in FIRREA, protected the 
FDIC from Louisiana’s state-law rein-
scription requirements. The Fifth Circuit 
rejected this view and afirmed the dis-
trict court, holding that “[a]lthough 
failure to reinscribe a mortgage may 
result in the application of an ‘invol-
untary lien’ to FDIC property, FIRREA 
does not provide relief.” The court 
noted that before FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1825 only exempted the FDIC from 
taxation while acting in its corporate 
capacity and that FIRREA added sub-
section (b) to extend that exemption to 
FDIC in its role as receiver. McFarland, 
243 F.3d at 886 (“[w]e are persuaded 
that section 1825(b)(2) merely extends 
the general exemption of the FDIC from 
taxation to the receivership context”) 
(citing from the House Report accom-
panying FIRREA). The court refused 
to apply 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) to liens 
not attached by state and local taxing 
authorities:
As Jump and Bank One are pri-
vate entities possessing normal 
judgment liens, however, their 
claims are not barred by sec-
tion 1825(b)(2). We therefore 
ind that FIRREA does not pre-
clude the application of Louisiana 
reinscription law to the FDIC’s 
property. Nothing in FIRREA 
prevents Louisiana law from 
recognizing either the FDIC’s 
obligation to reinscribe mort-
gages or the loss of ranking 
suffered by the FDIC if it fails 
to meet this obligation. FIRREA 
only prohibits state and local enti-
ties from taking advantage of the 
FDIC’s failure to reinscribe by 
attaching liens and other instru-
ments to satisfy tax judgments.
McFarland, 243 F.3d at 886. If (as FHFA 
has suggested) interpretive precedent 
under 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) is appropri-
ately used to construe 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)
(3), then the decision in McFarland sug-
gests that § 4617(j)(3) does not apply to 
invalidate a lien foreclosure sale by a 
private owners’ association in a UCA 
or UCIOA state. As a result, an asso-
ciation lien foreclosure in such a state 
would extinguish a Fannie or Freddie 
mortgage lien—even without FHFA’s 
consent to the sale—if the priority por-
tion of the assessment is not satisied 
before the sale.
Conclusion
The notion that FHFA and the GSEs 
can thumb their noses at time-honored 
state law priority rules is deeply offen-
sive. The GSEs themselves have, in the 
past, consistently acted as though they 
were fully bound by those rules. From 
the inception of the uniform Fannie 
Mae-Freddie Mac 1-4 family mortgage 
and note instruments, for example, 
the GSEs have always been careful 
to obtain reviews by local counsel to 
ensure that the documents conformed 
to the varying laws of the individual 
states. They have asserted no federally 
preemptive right to disregard state law. 
Their claim to the power to ignore state 
priority law under HERA is unexpected. 
It is not justiied by any emergency 
because—whatever the exigencies of 
the mortgage crisis—the procedure 
that allows an otherwise-irst mortgage 
lender to protect its lien from destruc-
tion by the foreclosure of a prior owners’ 
association lien is perfectly clear and 
simple to employ. Any such destruction 
is a consequence of nothing more than 
Fannie’s or Freddie’s servicer being 
asleep at the switch. There is no reason 
the homeowners’ association should 
be punished for the servicer’s careless-
ness; rather, Fannie or Freddie should 
seek reimbursement from the servicer 
for such losses. The authors hope and 
believe the courts will understand this 
and will continue to hold the GSEs to 
the normal standards of state priority 
law. n
